

# **We Only Kill Each Other**

by

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## **Abstract**

The American Cosa Nostra (ACN) evolved from the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (SCN). The SCN's tradition, generally followed by the ACN, prohibits harm of honest public officials. The SCN violated this prohibition repeatedly from 1979 to 1993. The much greater rate of murders of public officials by the SCN was likely due to, relative to the U.S., more public support for the state when it did not attack the SCN, more public tolerance of an aggressive SCN, a larger percentage of votes controlled by the SCN in elections, less integration of SCN leaders in society, and, possibly, a lower law enforcement effort.

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## **I. Introduction**

The roots of the American Cosa Nostra (ACN), commonly referred to as the Mafia, are in the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (SCN). The ACN follows the Sicilian tradition: police, politicians, other public servants, and journalists are not to be killed for doing their jobs (Bonnano and Abromovitz, 2011, p.94). When builder Del Webb was nervous about working with notorious mobster and killer Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel in building the Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas in the 1940s, Siegel reportedly said to Webb: “We only kill each other” (Koch, 2008).

The prohibition against killing police and other public officials is generally followed in the U.S. by the ACN. The SCN violated this prohibition in Sicily during the period 1979 to 1993 when the SCN was at war with the state. The different behavior of the ACN and the SCN in murdering those I call public officials has not been considered previously.

The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, although the ANC is a separate organization from the SCN, I show that the traditions of the ACN and ANC are the same. The founders of the ACN were of Sicilian descent, and some had been members of the SCN before coming to the U.S.

Second, I show that the ACN murdered public officials at a much lower rate than the SCN. I compare Chicago during Prohibition (1919 to 1933) with the SCN attacks on the state from 1979 to 1993. Chicago and Sicily are compared because there is good data for murders of public servants in both places in those time periods. I also consider ACN murders of public officials in the entire U.S.

Third, I offer an explanation for why the SCN significantly diverged from its traditional policies and murdered a significant number of public officials. Although the state threatened

increased profit from drugs and other activity for the SCN beginning in the 1970s, this alone does not explain why the SCN struck at the state. Alcohol prohibition in the U.S. from 1919 to 1933 also likely involved a significant increase in profit, yet the ACN generally did not attack public officials.

## **2. The Sicilian roots of the American Cosa Nostra**

By 1900, men with SCN connections were in New York City, New Orleans, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Pennsylvania mining towns. Evidence of members of the SCN in New York City dates to 1884. Between 1900 and 1903, Giuseppe Morello assembled an ACN family in Manhattan. By 1903, the Morello Family had thirty members, all of whom were of Sicilian extraction (Dash, 2009, pp.71-73, 81-82, and 95-96).

SCN members leaving Sicily for the U.S. used letters from SCN bosses to gain admittance to Morello's family. Later, as other SCN families formed, such letters were required for one to move between cities. By 1906, the ACN was a loose group of families in eight to ten cities. Morello was the first boss of bosses, which meant he was an advisor to and arbitrator of disputes between other families. By 1909, there was a central ACN council of top bosses (to set broad strategy), and a larger general assembly of ACN members (as many as 150) would meet (Dash, 2009, pp.97, 140, 142-143, and 234).

By 1912, there were three additional ACN families in New York City. Their bosses were Cola Schiro and Manfredi Mineo in Brooklyn, and Toto D'Aquila in Italian Harlem. By 1921, Morello merged remnants of his family with the new family of Joe Masseria. Schiro, Mineo, and D'Aquila still headed families, and a fifth family had emerged headed by Tom Reina. Today's

five New York City ACN families have their origins in the families that existed in 1921.

D'Aquila became boss of bosses in 1910 (after Morello's imprisonment), and Masseria replaced D'Aquila when the latter was murdered in 1928 Dash (2009, pp.245-249, 271-272, and 278).

Along with the Sicilian-based Cosa Nostra, two other large Italian crime organizations have existed since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, both located on the Italian mainland. One is the Camorra, which is based in the Campania region, with Naples a location for many of these criminals. A second organization, the 'Ndrangheta, is located in the Calabrian region.<sup>1</sup> Between 1890 and 1920, American copies of Camorra families and numerous 'Ndrangheta cells were created (Capeci, 2004, p.6, and Hunt, 2015, pp.58-59).

Initially, one had to be of Sicilian descent to belong to the ACN. After Giuseppe Morello was imprisoned in 1910, his family admitted its first non-Sicilian members (Dash, 2009, p.235). The necessity for significantly more personnel to produce, smuggle, and transport illegal alcohol during Prohibition meant ACN families began to admit those of Italian, but not necessarily Sicilian, heritage in the 1920s. Calabrians were admitted to ACN families soon after Prohibition began, somewhat before those from Campania (often called Neapolitans) because the 'Ndrangheta cells in the U.S. had experience smuggling prostitutes and alcohol between Ontario and the U.S. prior to Prohibition (Hunt (2015, p.72).

A violent dispute, known as the Castellammarese War, between two important ACN bosses, Joe Masseria and Salavatore Maranzano, and their allies occurred in 1930-31. When Masseria was killed in 1931, Maranzano became the last bosses of bosses. Maranzano was murdered later in 1931. Because of manpower requirements during the Castellammarese War,

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<sup>1</sup> Calabria is the southernmost region of mainland Italy, just north of Sicily. Campania is north and west of Calabria.

some of Maranzano's allies embraced Italians who were not Sicilians, adding to the impetus that began with Prohibition to admit non-Sicilians to the ACN Hunt (2015, p.65).

One example of the importance of Sicilian heritage in the ACN early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century involves Al Capone, boss of a predominantly Italian-American crime family in Chicago later known as the Outfit. During the Castellammarese War, it is alleged that Capone, a Neapolitan, officially became a member of Masseria's family by killing their mutual enemy in Chicago, Joe Aiello (Hortis, 2014, p.77).<sup>2</sup> Capone received the imprimatur of formal membership in the Cosa Nostra, and Masseria gained an ally and had a rival eliminated.

During his brief period as boss of bosses, Salvatore Maranzano formalized the ACN based on SCN traditions. The principle of *omerta*---loyalty to the family and no cooperation with law enforcement---was introduced from Sicily. Membership required 100% Italian (not necessarily Sicilian) heritage. After Maranzano's murder, a national commission (see below) was formed. The most dominant boss---Salavatore Lucania, better known as Charlie "Lucky" Luciano---endorsed Maranzano's policies (and other bosses concurred), except that there would be no boss of bosses. These policies and the structure instituted in 1931 still exist Raab (2005, pp.29, 32, and 34). Another important Sicilian tradition adopted by the ACN was that public servants would not be killed (Bonanno and Abromovitz, 2011, p.94).<sup>3</sup>

The ACN post-1931 had a lot in common with the ACN pre-1931. In both periods there were strong links between the ACN and the SCN, non-Sicilians were admitted to the ACN, and a national council or commission existed. However, prior to the Castellammarese War, the ACN

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<sup>2</sup> Petepiece (2018, pp.18 and 42) claims Capone was associated with Masseria's family when he moved to Chicago around 1920, likely had Masseria's blessing for the move, and became a capo in Masseria's family in 1928.

<sup>3</sup> Also, Pisano (1987, p.87) notes the Sicilian tradition prohibited violence against women, children, and those who were not a direct target of a criminal venture. Zingales (2017, p.15) claims organized crime violence is "...an out of equilibrium threat, rarely carried through." That was not true in Sicily in the latter part of the twentieth century.

families were basically extensions of SCN families. Either after the Castellammarese War, or after the 1931 murder of Maranzano and the establishment of the national ACN commission, Sicilian immigrants were no longer admitted to ACN families via a letter from SCN members.<sup>4</sup>

The national ACN commission initially had seven members. All except Al Capone were of Sicilian heritage.<sup>5</sup> For the next twenty years, except for Chicago, all of the bosses of families on the ACN commission were of Sicilian heritage.<sup>6</sup> The strong ties of the ACN to Sicily from the earliest days of the ACN persisted for a long time. To this day, the ACN gets reinforcements from Sicily. Recent immigrants from Sicily may have essentially taken over the Gambino Family (Raab, 2005, p.34, and McCreesh, 2016). In the indictments in the so-called Commission Case in 1985 in New York City, one of the accusations was that the ACN commission was responsible for controlling relations between the ACN and the SCN (Petepiece, 2018, p.3).

The ACN is and has been distinct from the SCN since at least 1931. Sicilian heritage has not been required for full membership in the ACN since early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, Sicily is where the ACN traditions developed. An important tradition is to not kill public

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<sup>4</sup> Critchley (2006, pp.53 and 56) dates this policy change to the end of the Castellammarese War, but it may have been after Maranzano's murder.

<sup>5</sup> The initial ACN families on the national commission were the five New York City families, the Chicago Outfit, and the Buffalo Family, the latter headed by Stefano Maggadino. The other members (with the name of each family today in parentheses) were Charlie Luciano (Genovese Family), Joseph Bonanno Sr. (Bonanno Family), Vincent Mangano (Gambino Family), Gaetano Gagliano (Lucchese Family), and Joseph Profaci (Colombo Family). Bonanno and Abromovitz differ slightly from the above in that they suggest the commission initially consisted of the five New York City families, with Chicago and Buffalo added within months (Capeci, 2004, p.6, and Bonanno and Abromovitz, 2011, pp.75-79).

<sup>6</sup> The commission met every five years beginning in 1931, but Bonanno and Abromovitz (2011, p.44-45) claim it met twice in 1931, the first meeting with only the five New York City families. Beginning with the second meeting in 1931, for the five meetings between 1931 and 1951, Bonanno, Gagliano, Maggadino, and Profaci, all of Sicilian heritage, were bosses and were family representatives on the commission. The Chicago bosses in this time period--- Al Capone, Frank Nitti, and Paul Ricca---were not of Sicilian descent. Ricca represented the Chicago Outfit before he was boss (for Nitti), and after he was boss. Mangano remained as boss and commission representative for what is now called the Gambino Family until he was murdered and replaced in both roles by Albert Anastasia (a Calabrian) in 1951. Beginning in 1936, first Vito Genovese (a Neapolitan), and then Frank Costello (a Calabrian) represented what is now known as the Genovese Family on the commission, but the boss of the family until 1953 was Charlie Luciano (Bonanno and Abromovitz, 2011, p.44). Luciano was imprisoned in 1936 and deported in 1946.

servants. As will be shown in the next three sections, that tradition is much more likely to be honored in the U.S. than in Sicily.

### **3. Murders of public officials in Chicago, 1919-1933**

I focus on Prohibition Era Chicago for several reasons. First, detailed data on murders believed to be committed by organized crime groups in Chicago during Prohibition have been collected.<sup>7</sup> Second, Chicago was known as a particularly violent city in the U.S.<sup>8</sup> Third, Prohibition in the U.S. spanned a time period comparable to that of the SCN war on the state--- 1919-1933 for the former, and 1979-1993 for the latter. Fourth, the large increase in revenue (and, presumably, profit) earned by organized crime in the U.S. during Prohibition is comparable to that earned in Sicily in the 1970s and 1980s (Section 7). Finally, Chicago and Sicily were relatively similar in population. Sicily had a population of 4.68 million in 1980, which was 1.733 times the 2.7 million population of Chicago in 1930.

There were eighteen major bootlegging gangs in Chicago at some point during Prohibition. The Chicago Outfit was the largest gang, and was predominantly Italian-American.<sup>9</sup> In 1924, the Outfit may have had 300 to 400 members (Binder, 2017, pp.83-84).

I focus on apparent gangland murders of honest public officials, with the ultimate objective being murders that were premeditated and were committed by gangs that were

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<sup>7</sup> The data are found in Binder and Eghigian (2013), Johnson (2014), and Binder (2017). Prohibition resulted from the eighteenth amendment to the U.S. constitution, and did not take effect until 1920. However, by a separate act, wartime prohibition began in 1919. I thank John Binder for the latter point (e-mail to the author, September 19, 2018).

<sup>8</sup> A quote attributed to Charlie Luciano regarding Chicago during prohibition: “A real goddamn crazy place. Nobody’s safe in the streets” (Binder and Eghigian, 2013, p.219).

<sup>9</sup> Binder (2017, p.82) estimates that almost 60% of the members of the Outfit were of Italian descent at the outset of Prohibition.

predominantly Italian-American. I narrowed the list to eighteen murders (Appendix A) that break down as follows. Unless otherwise indicated, the murders were apparently premeditated. Other organizations means they were not Italian-American.

- Eight murders by members of Italian-American organizations.
- Six murders by members of other organizations or no organization.
- Two murders by unknown individuals.
- One spur of the moment murder by members of an Italian-American organization.
- One inadvertent murder of someone by members of an Italian-American organization.

The Chicago Outfit was responsible for only one of the eight premeditated murders of honest public officials. Johnny Torrio (1919-1925) and Al Capone (1925-1932) controlled the Outfit for most of Prohibition. Torrio was known as one who valued diplomacy, and Capone ordered his men not to resist federal agents (Binder, 2017, pp.241-242). Thus, it is doubtful the Outfit was responsible for murders of other public officials. There may have been additional murders of public officials by other Italian-American gangs. However, with only two such unknown murders on my list, I am fairly confident of the number of honest public officials I believe were the victims of premeditated murder by Italian-American organizations in Prohibition Chicago: *eight*.

#### **4. Murders involving public officials in the U.S. by the American Cosa Nostra**

In the period 1979-1993, the SCN reaped huge profit from drugs, particularly heroin. It is not clear how much the ACN earned from drugs in that period. One estimate is that the import price of a kilo of heroin was approximately \$200,000. Carmine Galante, self-proclaimed boss of the Bonnano Family in the late 1970s, purportedly charged an import fee of \$5,000 per kilo. I do



not know if the ACN earned anything else from importing heroin, or whether the rest of the profit went to the SCN (Blumenthal, 1988, pp.7, 21, 24, and 33).

There were only four murders of public officials in the U.S. in the period 1979-1993 by the ACN (see below), all in New York City. Only one such murder was at all drug related, and none involved the ACN attacking public officials because the latter threatened the ACN's drug profit. For the entire history of the ACN, there have been few murders of public officials. Possibly the first such murder occurred in New Orleans in 1890: Police Chief David Hennessy. However, he may have been on the payroll of the Provenzanos, one of two rival groups of individuals of Sicilian heritage who fought over the right to unload ships carrying fruit. Investigators suspected the other group, the Matrangas, in the murder (Capeci, 2004. pp.108-109).

In 1909, fabled New York City detective Joe Petrosino travelled to Italy to seek information about Italian immigrants in the U.S. who might have criminal records in Italy.<sup>10</sup> Petrosino was murdered in Palermo, Sicily. Evidence suggests that ACN mob boss Giuseppe Morrelo and his confederate Ignazio Lupo plotted the murder, along with Sicilian Vito Cascio Ferro, later a ranking member of the SCN, but who had recently lived in the U.S. (Talty, 2017, p.230). The fact the plotters waited until Petrosino was in Sicily to murder him, when they had ample opportunity to kill him in the U.S., suggests the reluctance of the ACN to kill public officials. Petrosino was murdered in a way that Sicilians would be blamed for the crime.

The four ACN murders of public officials in the period 1979-1993 began in 1986. Two New York City police officers were shot and one was killed. They had conducted surveillance of

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<sup>10</sup> A 1907 law allowed the deportation of immigrants who had been in the U.S. for less than three years, and were found to have criminal records (Talty, 2017, p.172).

Genovese Family gangster Fritzi Giovanelli and his cohorts. Allegedly, Giovanelli and his associates followed the officers to a store and fired upon them (McShane, 2016, pp.129-130).

In 1987, while in prison, but still boss of the Colombo Family, Carmine Persico instructed Colombo consigliere Joel Cacace to murder William Aronwald, who had prosecuted Persico's brother. The murder team mistakenly killed William Aronwald's father (Capeci, 2004, pp.388-389). In 1997, Cacace allegedly ordered the murder of police officer Ralph Dols (Capeci, 2013), presumably because Dols had married Cacace's ex-wife. There is no evidence that either murder was approved by the ACN Commission.

Finally, in 1989, Everett Hatcher, working undercover for the Drug Enforcement Agency, was murdered by Bonanno associate Gus Farace. Apparently, Farace believed Hatcher was an informant and not a law enforcement agent (Celona and Jaeger, 2019). Farace was located and murdered by associates of the Bonnano Family (Capeci and Robbins, 2013, pp.252-257).

In the last two sections, I have shown that there have been murders of public officials in the U.S. by the ACN. There are likely ACN murders or attempted murders of public officials of which I am unaware. However, the evidence in this section suggests that the ACN ban on killing public officials has resulted in relatively few such murders. As I will now show, the situation in Sicily has been much different.

## **5. Murders of public officials by the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, 1979-1993**

Consider the number of honest public officials murdered by the SCN in the period 1979-1993. Details about these murders are in Appendix B. The source for the information on these murders is the excellent work on Italian organized crime by Santino (2015). In compiling the

SCN murder tally, I include any honest public official who was a direct target of the SCN. If it appears the attackers likely knew the target would be with family members, the latter are included.<sup>11</sup> The number of SCN murders on the list I compiled is *fifty-five*.

From Section 3, I multiply the number of honest public officials I believe were the victims of premeditated murder by Italian-American organizations in Prohibition Chicago, eight, by the Sicilian population in 1980 divided by the Chicago population in 1930, 1.733. That yields approximately *fourteen* population-adjusted murders for Chicago.

Clearly, there is a startling difference in the number of murders committed in Chicago from 1919 to 1933 and in Sicily from 1979 to 1993. Also, with relatively few murders of honest public officials by the ACN in the U.S. (Section 4), it is clear that the ACN generally did, and the SCN did not, follow the Cosa Nostra tradition of not killing honest public officials.

## **6. The war against the state by the Sicilian Cosa Nostra**

During the 1970s, the fight against domestic terrorists demonstrated that the Italian police could be effective if they had enough political support. The emphasis on terror allowed the SCN to create a big drug production network.<sup>12</sup> The appointment of General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa as prefect<sup>13</sup> of Palermo in March 1982 signified increased law enforcement activity against the SCN (Stille, 1995, pp.64-65).

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<sup>11</sup> For example, in 1992, a bomb planted in a road killed prosecutor Giovanni Falcone, his wife, and three bodyguards. It is likely the perpetrators knew Falcone's routine, including who usually travelled with him.

<sup>12</sup> By the mid-1980s, the SCN had built twelve heroin refineries in Sicily, and six such facilities in northern Italy (Sterling, 1990, p.40).

<sup>13</sup> A prefect is the state's representative in a province, the chief law enforcement official.

The war against the state by the SCN had already begun in 1979 with six murders of honest public officials (Appendix B). A key victim in that year was Cesare Terranova, who was about to become chief investigating magistrate for Palermo when he was murdered (Longrigg, 2008, p.37).

The new campaign against the SCN by law enforcement came at a time when the SCN, under the Corleonesi<sup>14</sup> Luciano Liggio, had taken over new businesses involving the expanding heroin trade and the real estate boom around Palermo (Acconcia *et al.*, 2014, p.1137). The expansion of the SCN's economic power in the 1970s gave the organization greater political autonomy, and lead to a rift with the state (De Feo and De Luca, 2015, p.16). It is likely that Totò Riina became the most important SCN boss after Liggio's imprisonment in 1974.

Giuliano Andreotti, the former and future prime minister, who had close ties to the SCN, purportedly met with SCN bosses in 1980. They told him they were in charge in Sicily. The SCN bosses warned Andreotti not to bother their businesses. They threatened to withdraw the votes they controlled for Andreotti's Christian Democratic Party (Stille, 1995, p.391).

Giuseppe Falcone, future investigating magistrate and SCN murder victim, believed that Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa's appointment as prefect of Palermo caused Riina and his group to fear that Dalla Chiesa would be an impediment to their consolidation of power. Ordinary citizens supported Dalla Chiesa; the state did not (Stille, 1995, p.70, and Sterling, 1990, p.229).

More experienced SCN bosses, many from Palermo, warned the Corleonesi not to attack the state. They argued that the SCN would lose public support, and the state would crush the SCN. The Corleonesi did not believe the state would react to an attack on it (Stille, 1995, p.106,

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<sup>14</sup> The term Corleonesi was applied to clans lead by Liggio, Totò Riina, and later Bernardo Provenzano. The term was used because the leaders of this clan were from the town of Corleone in Sicily.

and Longrigg, 2008, p.37). After the SCN murdered Dalla Chiesa in 1982, one important SCN clan, the Grecos, said that killing Dalla Chiesa was a mistake, but it was now necessary to kill all who interfered with SCN business (Stille, 1995, p.82). Michele Greco was the figurehead head of the SCN commission, installed by Totò Riina. Greco supported various violations of SCN rules, including the murder of public officials (Stille, 1995, p.108).

Giuseppe Falcone believed that the murders of police inspector Beppe Montana and police officer Nino Cassarà in 1985 were designed to stop investigations that could lead to maxi trials (Stille, 1995, p.171). Riina's war on the state was designed to bring the state to its knees (Longrigg, 2017).

The average annual number of murders of public officials by the SCN in the period of 1979-1993 was 3.67. Relative calm prevailed in the SCN war against the state beginning in the late 1980s. For example, there were no such murders in 1986 and 1987, and there were two murders each year from 1989-1991 (Appendix B). The reduction in murders of public officials was apparently a carrot to the Italian politicians. Totò Riina and the other Corleonesi leaders believed their war against the state would induce politicians to pressure judges to annul the 1987 guilty verdicts in the so called Maxi Trial. When the Supreme Court upheld these verdicts, the SCN struck out, murdering fourteen public officials in 1992.

After the murder of Judge Giuseppe Falcone and his replacement Judge Paolo Borsellino in 1992, the Italian government sent 7,000 troops to Sicily to aid law enforcement (Dickie, 2014, p.582). At the time of Falcone's death, he was due to be promoted to the job of anti-Mafia prosecutor for Italy (Jones, 2019). The fourteen murders of public officials in 1992 were double the highest number in any other year from 1979-1993 (Appendix B).

Alesina *et al.* (2019, p.458) claim that Totò Riina and Bernardo Provenzano, the two most important SCN leaders at the outbreak of the SCN war against the state, had a different propensity for violence against the state. However, that conclusion appears to be mainly incorrect. It is true that the Palermo SCN had a different view of violence against the state than the Corleonesi, and, if the latter had not taken power in the SCN, an SCN war against the state would have been unlikely. Palermo SCN bosses lived in society, and tried to work with and avoid violence against public officials. The Corleonesi were often fugitives, ruling while on the run, and they moved quickly against opponents in the state (Stille, 1995, p.107).

After the fact, Provenzano decried the bombing of Falcone. However, prior to the Falcone bombing, Provenzano inquired of his contacts in government and business what the response would be if Falcone and Judge Borsellino (Falcone's likely replacement) were murdered.<sup>15</sup> Provenzano got a positive response. When Borsellino replaced Falcone, informants said some in government wanted Borsellino dead. Prosecutor Nino DiMatteo said Provenzano would have spoken out had he disagreed with killing Falcone and Borsellino. The SCN leaders were in full agreement to commit the murders (Longrigg, 2008, pp.104 and 108).

After Riina's arrest in January of 1993, Provenzano was in charge of the SCN. He pushed for no more violence in Sicily, but he supported a number of terrorist bombings outside Sicily.<sup>16</sup> By the mid-1990s, after seeing the state's response following the murders of judges Falcone and Borsellino, Provenzano decreed there would be no more violence against anyone (Longrigg, 2008, pp.130, 144, and 155).

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<sup>15</sup> Falcone believed that Bruno Contrado, a senior investigator in the Italian secret service, was behind the failed plot to kill Falcone and his wife with explosives in 1989 (Jones, 2019).

<sup>16</sup> These occurred in several Italian cities including Florence and Milan (Longrigg, 2008, p.120).

Thus, the evidence is that Riina was not an aberration. Provenzano's willingness to use violence against the state was characteristic of the Corleonesi who then ruled the SCN. Violence did not lead the state to reverse the Maxi Trial verdicts. Murdering judges Falcone and Borsellino contributed to an even stronger effort by the state against the SCN. The later terrorist bombings did not reduce the state's effort against the SCN, and Provenzano backed down. It is possible Riina would have continued the SCN's war had he not been incarcerated, but he would have risked being removed from power. It was clear that the SCN had gambled and lost. Provenzano's use of violence changed only because the situation changed.

## **7. An attack on the state**

### *A. Discussion*

In this section, I consider when an attack by organized crime against the state is more likely. In particular, I consider the differences between the U.S. and Italy that may explain why the ACN has not and the SCN has attacked the state. I employ a simple model that allows me to consider the relevant variables.

The classic paper on pressure groups is Becker (1983). He developed a model where some groups are taxed and others are subsidized by the state. In Becker's model, the state is relatively passive; it simply responds to the pressure groups. Becker was particularly interested in how deadweight loss affects the resulting subsidies and taxes. Deadweight loss plays no role in my model---a different kind of deaths is of interest!

Typically, the group receiving the subsidy delivers payments (bribes and campaign contributions) to the government, and the taxed group is the one with the most votes to deliver. The government trades off one kind of support for the other. In contrast, the SCN both delivers

financial resources and votes (see below). Also, Becker's model did not consider violence as a threat to the state. Thus, my approach is quite different than that in Becker (1983).

However, like Becker (1983, p.378), I ignore strategic interactions between the *state* and an *organized crime group* (OCG). I do not formally model this problem as a sequential game because I am not concerned with the equilibrium outcome between the OCG and the state. I am only interested in when the OCG would attack the state.

Conversely, Alesina *et al.* (2019) use a game-theoretic model with an OCG that uses violence around elections to signal its strength to the government. However, as discussed in Section 6, the war against the Italian state conducted by Totò Riina (and later briefly by Bernardo Provenzano) was designed to eliminate those who opposed the SCN. Also, there is no reason to believe the state was uncertain of the threat posed by the SCN under the Corleonesi.

#### *B. A price-theoretic model.*

As was the case in Sicily in 1979, the state is now engaged in an attack on the OCG. Suppose either a *weak* or a *strong* state would, due to public pressure, go after the OCG. However, if the OCG attacks the state in retaliation, a weak state would react by reducing its effort against the OCG, whereas a strong state would increase such effort. I consider a strong state, with the OCG uncertain whether the state is strong or weak. Indeed, in Sicily, the SCN attacked the state, and the state increased its effort against the SCN.

The OCG has two choices in response to the state's actions against the OCG. It can attack the state, or it can continue to earn the current profit,  $y$ . If the OCG attacks the state, the OCG's profit is  $x$  if the state chooses a *weak* response, and is  $z$  if the state chooses a *strong* response. The OCG has information about the state's payoffs if the OCG attacks, and thus on the



probability the state will choose a strong or weak response. The state's initial payoff has no bearing on the OCG's decision.

The state's payoffs depend on legal compensation for elected officials, public support for the elected officials or their party, and support from the OCG. The latter includes bribes and the procurement of electoral support from the OCG. Although technically part of the state, law enforcement will, to some extent, be treated separately.

In order for the OCG to be uncertain of the state's response, some randomness must exist in the state's payoffs. This can occur when the state is weak, when the state is strong, or both. Any of the three possibilities yields the same result. I put the randomness in the case the state chooses to be strong. If the state is strong, then its payoff equals  $s + \varepsilon$ , with  $\varepsilon$  having a density function of  $f(\varepsilon)$ , and a cumulative density function of  $F(\varepsilon)$ .

The state's payoff is  $w$  if it is weak. Both the state and the OCG know  $w$  and  $s$ ; only the state knows the actual value of  $\varepsilon$ . It is assumed there is no way the state can credibly communicate the value of  $\varepsilon$  to the OCG. If that were not true, the OCG would know with certainty whether the state would be weak or strong in response to an attack by the OCG. It appears the SCN was not certain how the Italian state would respond to an attack on it.

The OCG believes the state will respond strongly if attacked by the OCG if:

$$s + \varepsilon \geq w. \tag{1}$$

Let  $p$  equal the OCG's assessed probability that the state will be strong if attacked by the OCG, using *ineq.*(1). Then:

$$p = \text{prob}(\varepsilon \geq w-s), \text{ or}$$

$$p = 1 - F(w-s). \tag{2}$$

Nothing is assumed about the relative magnitudes of  $s$  and  $w$ . Presumably they are positive---the politicians continue to operate in either case. The OCG chooses to attack the state if the OCG's expected profit at least equals its current profit,  $y$ . This implies:

$$(1-p)x + pz \geq y, \text{ or}$$

$$p \leq \frac{x-y}{x-z} \equiv p^*. \tag{3}$$

The OCG attacks the state only if it believes that  $p \leq p^*$ . I assume that  $x > y > z \geq 0$ . The highest profit for the OCG,  $x$ , is when it attacks the state and the state is weak and reduces its activities against the OCG. Since the SCN stayed in business after the state chose to be strong, I assume the OCG's profit in that case,  $z$ , is nonnegative.

The final question is why I assume  $y > z$  since a strong response by the state could mean continuing what it had done before the OCG attacked. The Palermo SCN leaders believed the state's response to an SCN attack would be to step up the state's activities. The Maxi Trial and the 7,000 troops dispatched to Sicily suggest that is what happened. Also, if  $y = z$ , then  $p^* = 1$ :

the OCG would *always* attack the state. The OCG's profit if the state were strong would be the same as it is if the OCG did not attack. Since profit for the OCG increases if the state is weak, as long as  $p > 0$ , the OCG would be strictly better off in expectation if it attacked the state.

In the rest of this section, I consider how different exogenous variables affect any or all of the variables  $x$ ,  $y$ ,  $z$ ,  $s$ , and  $w$ . Let  $\theta$  represent an exogenous variable of interest. Then:

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial \theta} = -f(w-s) \left[ \frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} - \frac{\partial s}{\partial \theta} \right], \text{ and} \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{1}{[x-y]^2} \left[ (y-z) \frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} + (z-x) \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} + (x-y) \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} \right]. \quad (5)$$

The OCG is more likely to attack the state the lower is  $p$  and the larger is  $p^*$ .

### *C. Increased profit for the organized crime group*

As noted in Section 6, the SCN stated that it attacked the state because the state interfered with the SCN's lucrative drug trade and construction interests in Palermo. Let an increase in  $\theta$  represent an increase in the OCG's total revenue and thus profit. Suppose  $\theta$  has an identical impact on profit in all possible situations for the OCG. Then  $\frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} \equiv k > 0$  and:

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{k}{[x-y]^2} [\text{zero}] = 0. \quad (6)$$

If profit is affected the same, independent of whether the OCG attacks the state, there is no direct effect of increased revenue on the probability the OCG will attack the state. There is a possible indirect effect on the likelihood the OCG attacks. If bribes are increased when there is more OCG profit, and if bribes do not occur if the state strongly attacks the OCG, then  $\frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial s}{\partial \theta} = 0$ , so  $\frac{\partial p}{\partial \theta} = -f(w-s) \frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} < 0$ : it is more likely the OCG attacks the state.

However, it is likely that profit increases more with the same increase in revenue the less vigilant the state is in dealing with the OCG. This implies that  $\frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} > \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} > \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} > 0$ . Then, a sufficient condition for  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} > 0$  is that  $(y-z) \frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} \geq (x-z) \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta}$ . Since  $x > y$ , it is not guaranteed that the effect of  $\theta$  on  $p^*$  via  $x$  exceeds the effect of  $\theta$  on  $p^*$  via  $y$ . A sufficient condition for  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} > 0$  is:

$$\frac{\xi_{x,\theta}}{\xi_{y,\theta}} \geq \frac{xy-yz}{xy-xz}, \quad (7)$$

where  $\xi_{i,\theta}$  represents the elasticity of  $i$  w.r.t.  $\theta$ ,  $i = x, y$ , and the RHS of *ineq.(7)* exceeds one.

Thus, only if the elasticity of profit with respect to revenue is sufficiently larger when the state is weak than it is if the OCG does not attack the state is it guaranteed that  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} > 0$ .

Higher profit is not enough reason for the SCN to have attacked the Italian state in 1979 when the ACN did not attack the U.S. state during Prohibition. From the lifestyles of Al Capone and other prominent bootleggers, Prohibition yielded tremendous profit for these individuals. While profit estimates are difficult to determine, there are estimates of revenue from bootlegging. One estimate is that bootlegging revenue was approximately \$3.6 billion for the U.S. by 1926 (Okrent, 2010, p.274).

The U.S. GDP deflator index for 1929 (the earliest year I can find) is 9.424, and for 2010 it is 96.76. Thus, \$3.6 billion $\left(\frac{96.76}{9.24}\right) \approx \$37.7$  billion.

IRS estimates suggest the Chicago Outfit had revenue in the late 1920s of over \$100 million, most of it from bootlegging (Nicholas and Chen, 2012, p.10). Another study suggested that annual Outfit revenue from beer sales alone may have reached \$275 million.<sup>17</sup> In comparison, Calderoni (2014) estimates that all Italian organized crime annual revenue from drugs circa 2010 was €3.3 billion (about \$2.5 billion).<sup>18</sup>

Huge revenue (and likely profit) for the SCN in 1979 is not sufficient to explain why they attacked the Italian state when the ACN did not attack public officials in the U.S. during Prohibition. Other factors must be considered.

#### *D. More tolerance from the public for a weak state and support for an aggressive OCG*

From the end of World War Two until the 1990s, Italians tolerated corruption in the leading political party, the Christian Democrats, in order to keep the Communist Party from gaining power.<sup>19</sup> In the early 1990s, the Cold War ended. Then the state chose to strongly respond to the SCN's attacks on the state that began in 1979. With the Communists now

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<sup>17</sup> The Secret Six, a group of prominent Chicagoans, sponsored private police activity against the bootleggers. A Secret Six investigation estimated that the Outfit shipped 100,000 barrels of beer per week at a price of \$55 per barrel (Collins and Schwartz, 2018, p.349). Using fifty weeks per year yields the \$275 million figure. Capone scoffed at the idea his breweries shipped that much beer.

<sup>18</sup>Much of the SCN's drug business was taken over by the 'Ndrangheta before 2000. I do not know if the 'Ndrangheta replaced the SCN in selling heroin to the U.S. Conversely, the 'Ndrangheta supposedly had 70-80% of the European cocaine market at that time (Perry, 2018, pp.16-17, and 35), and that may have exceeded what the SCN previously had. Suffice it to say both organizations likely found drugs to be very profitable when they were heavily involved in their sale. Perry claims annual 'Ndrangheta drug revenue of anywhere from \$50 billion to \$100 billion early in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but Calderoni (2014) argues such estimates are wildly inflated.

<sup>19</sup> In the 1960s, members of the Sicilian parliament were actual SCN members (Arlacchi, 1992, p.200).

perceived as less of a threat (Stille, 1995, p.9), the state's campaign against the SCN became more politically popular. Parties were pressured to rid themselves of those strongly attached to the SCN (Longrigg, 2008, p.79). Finally, by the mid-1990s, the SCN had damaged its business prospects by its war on the state (Longrigg, 2008, p.129).

Let a larger  $\theta$  now imply more support for the state, meaning the current ruling party, when the state is weak in its response to an attack on it by the OCG. Also, a larger  $\theta$  means more support for the SCN by businesses, and thus more profit, when it attacks the state. Hence, it should be the case that  $\frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial s}{\partial \theta} = 0$ , since the first point is how much the public will support a weak state response to support the OCG attack. Further, it should be true that  $\frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} > 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} = 0$ , since the second point is how much business works with the OCG when the OCG attacks the state. Thus:

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial \theta} = -f(w-s) \frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} < 0, \text{ and} \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{1}{[x-y]^2} \left[ (y-z) \frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} + (x-y) \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} \right] > 0. \quad (9)$$

More public support for the state when the state is weak, and more business support for the OCG when the OCG attacks the state both imply a greater likelihood the OCG attacks the state. Such support was much greater in Sicily than it has ever been in the U.S. There have been

politicians in the U.S. who were corrupted by organized crime, including the ACN. However, in general, politicians in the U.S. have been fairly tough on such criminals.<sup>20</sup>

The reduction in public support for the state and the SCN by the 1990s likely contributed to the end of the SCN's war against the Italian state.

#### *E. More support for the state from organized crime*

Compared to the ACN in the U.S., in Sicily the SCN has control of a significant percentage of politicians and of votes in elections. With one fourth of the Christian Democrat political base in Sicily, the SCN's political power is magnified. For years, prominent Christian Democrats accepted the SCN's support to enforce the position of the Christian Democrats vis-a-vis the Communist Party. In turn, the politicians favored by the SCN used their influence to subvert the police and judicial systems at the local and national levels (Alesina *et al.*, 2017, p.12). Between approximately 1950 and 1990, anywhere from 40% to 75% of the national parliament were openly supported by the SCN (Paoli, 2003, p.194).

All of the Italian organized crime groups are large per capita compared to the U.S. (Table 1). The SCN controls many votes, and has a tight hold on certain territories (De Feo and De Luca, 2017, p.135). In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, there were 1,500 to 2,000 SCN members in Palermo, who controlled 75,000 to 100,000 votes out of a total Palermo population of 1.25 million in 2012 (Cockayne, 2016, pp.80-90).

In contrast, when the Chicago Outfit moved its headquarters to the small town of Cicero, just outside of Chicago, with a population of approximately 70,000, the Outfit could only affect

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<sup>20</sup> See the discussion regarding President Herbert Hoover later in this section.

the 1924 election in Cicero by employing goons to intimidate voters at the polling places. Even with several hundred members, the Outfit had to borrow men from the North Side gang to use electoral violence (Binder, 2007, p.255).

Let a larger  $\theta$  reflect more support by the OCG for the state. Presumably this support is absent or much reduced if the state chooses to be strong. Also, there is no effect on the OCG's profit. Hence, it should be the case that  $\frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial s}{\partial \theta} = 0$ , but  $\frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} > 0$ . Thus,  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} = 0$  and  $\frac{\partial p}{\partial \theta} < 0$ .

More OCG support for the state implies a greater likelihood the OCG attacks the state, a result that may seem counter-intuitive. Why would an OCG attack a state it supports? The answer is that the state is not a monolith. As discussed in Section 6, some Italian government officials responded positively when SCN boss Bernardo Provenzano inquired about killing judges Falcone and Borsellino in 1992, yet the SCN supported many politicians at that time.

#### *F. The scale and corruptibility of law enforcement.*

Elected officials and law enforcement personnel do not always have the same goals in Sicily and in some of the other Italian regions. Law enforcement prosecutes criminals, and politicians influence appellate judges to overturn convictions.

Although there certainly were corrupt police officers, revenue agents, and Coast Guard members during Prohibition in the U.S., there was much pressure from elected officials and law enforcement on organized crime. President Herbert Hoover took office in March 1929 just weeks after Capone men slaughtered seven individuals affiliated with the North Side gang in the St.



Valentine's Day Massacre. Almost daily, Hoover would harangue his cabinet, particularly his Treasury Secretary, about getting Capone. Elmer Irey, head of the Internal Revenue Service, heard about Hoover's demands from Irey's boss, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon.<sup>21</sup> Irey's IRS investigators and prohibition agents lead by Elliot Ness were instrumental in obtaining a conviction of Capone for evading paying federal income taxes, which put an end to Capone's crime career. Although law enforcement increased its effort against the SCN in 1979, this effort was not strong relative to the U.S., and to Italian law enforcement in subsequent years.

Suppose a larger  $\theta$  means a larger and less corrupt law enforcement system. If the state is attacked and weakly responds, the effort by law enforcement has little importance: convictions are nullified or sentences are reduced significantly. This implies that  $\frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} = 0$ . However, a stronger effort by law enforcement negatively affects the OCG's profit when the state is not weak and supports law enforcement, so  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} < 0$ . Since the effort of law enforcement does not affect the state's payoffs,  $\frac{\partial s}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} = 0$ . Thus,  $\frac{\partial p}{\partial \theta} = 0$  and:

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{1}{[x-y]^2} \left[ (z-x) \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} + (x-y) \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} \right]. \quad (10)$$

The sign of  $eq.(10)$  is uncertain. If law enforcement has the same effect on the OCG's profit when it attacks the state and the state is strong as it does when the OCG does not attack the state, then  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} \equiv b < 0$ , and:

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<sup>21</sup> Eig (2010, pp.219-220). Although Eig argued that Hoover pushed for action against Capone early in 1929, Collins and Schwartz (2018, pp.599-600) provided evidence that Hoover's focus on Capone began in 1930.

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{b(z-y)}{(x-y)^2} > 0. \quad (11)$$

In that case, a stronger law enforcement effort leads to a greater probability the OCG attacks the state. This is because increased law enforcement effort has a larger effect (in absolute value) on  $p^*$  when the OCG does not attack the state than it does when OCG attacks and the state strongly responds. If law enforcement effort is weak, there is little reason to attack the state. An increase in the law enforcement effort increases the likelihood of an attack.

The result  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} > 0$  depends on the assumption that  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta}$ . However, if increased law enforcement effort complements the strong attack on OC, then  $|\frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta}| > |\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta}|$ . Then, it could be the case that  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} < 0$ . This is true if:

$$\frac{y(z-x)}{\theta} \xi_{y,\theta} + \frac{z(x-y)}{\theta} \xi_{z,\theta} < 0, \text{ or}$$

$$\frac{\xi_{z,\theta}}{\xi_{y,\theta}} > \frac{y(x-z)}{z(x-y)}, \quad (12)$$

where  $\xi_{j,\theta}$  represents the elasticity of  $j$  w.r.t.  $\theta$ ,  $j = y, z$ , and the RHS of *ineq.*(12) exceeds one.

There is no particular reason for  $|\xi_{z,\theta}|$  to be sufficiently larger than  $|\xi_{y,\theta}|$  so that  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} < 0$ . It is possible that, when  $\theta$  is low, it affects OCG profit with no OCG attack on the state,  $y$ , more than it affects OCG profit when the OCG attacks the state and the state is strong,  $z$ . However, if law enforcement effort increases even more, then  $z$  is affected sufficiently more than is  $y$ , so

$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} < 0$ . Thus, in 1979, the somewhat increased law enforcement in Sicily discussed above may not have been large enough for *ineq.* (12) to hold, so  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} > 0$ .

After Mussolini gained power in Italy, in October of 1925, he appointed Cesare Mori as a special prefect in Palermo, gave Mori an army of agents, and told him to crush the SCN. The SCN did not fight back (Varese, 2011, p.105). Thus, there is reason to believe that a strong enough law enforcement effort leads to a reduced likelihood of an OCG attack on the state. In Appendix C, I demonstrate the possibility that  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta}$  is first positive, and then becomes negative at larger values for  $\theta$ .

### *G. Integration of organized crime leaders with society*

Above, I considered support from the state for organized crime, and public support for the state when the state is weak against organized crime. A similar but different issue is how well integrated the OCG leaders are in society. As discussed in Section 6, the Corleonesi were not well integrated in society, whereas the Palermo SCN leaders they replaced were integrated. More integration should mean more profit for the SCN because it is then easier for the SCN to influence the state.

Assuming that such integration disappears with an attack by OCG on the state,  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} > 0$  and

$\frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} = 0$ , when  $d\theta > 0$  implies increased integration. Presumably, there is no effect of

integration on the state's payoffs, so  $\frac{\partial s}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} = 0$ .<sup>22</sup> Thus:

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<sup>22</sup> Increased integration could lead to more bribes for the state when the state is weak. In that case  $\frac{\partial w}{\partial \theta} > 0$  and

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{(z-x)}{(x-y)^2} \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} < 0. \quad (13)$$

Better integrated OCG leaders imply less likelihood of an attack on the state. The replacement of the Palermo SCN bosses at the head of the SCN by the less integrated Corleonesi likely increased the probability the SCN would attack the state.

## 8. Summary

The roots of the American Cosa Nostra (ACN) are in the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (SCN). The latter's tradition is to not harm (honest) public servants who simply do their jobs. However, particularly between 1979 and 1993, the SCN has been much more willing to attack public officials than has the ACN. The SCN's reason for their attack on the state appears to have been the threat to the state towards the SCN's increased profit in the 1970s from selling drugs and from construction projects in Palermo. However, similar profit from the ACN during Prohibition did not lead them to attack the state, nor has the relatively recent increased ACN involvement in selling drugs caused the U.S. organization to attack the state to try to protect its profit.

The different response in Sicily/Italy and the U.S. when highly profitable activities were threatened by the state is due to several apparent differences in those areas. Relative to the U.S., at least at the onset of the SCN war against the state in 1979, there was more public support for the state when the latter was weak in dealing with the SCN, and for the SCN when it attacked the state. Also, the SCN could produce a larger percentage of votes in elections. Additionally,

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$\frac{\partial p}{\partial \theta} < 0$ , which goes against the result in the text. However, this effect is likely to be small relative to the effect on  $p^*$ .

relative to those who had previously controlled the SCN who resided in Palermo, the SCN leaders who took over in the 1970s (the Corleonesi) were not from Palermo, and were not well integrated in society.

I found that the theoretical effect of a larger and less corruptible law enforcement effort---the case in the U.S. versus Sicily---on the likelihood of an attack on the state was uncertain because it would reduce a crime organization's profit with or without the organization attacking the state. A sufficiently large law enforcement effort *may* imply less likelihood a crime organization attacks the state, which would be another reason the ACN has not attacked the state in the U.S., and why the SCN stopped its attack on the Italian state as the latter significantly increased its effort against the SCN.

Recently, conditions have changed in Sicily and Italy. There is more support from the public for state attacks on organized crime, partly due to less fear of the Communist Party coming to power with the end of the Cold War. There may be fewer politicians who work with the SCN. Finally, the law enforcement effort against the SCN that increased in the 1980s has continued if not increased, including effort against the other Italian organized crime groups.

One might believe the SCN will never again attack the state. Perhaps. An informant alleged that the three major Italian crime organizations---the SCN, the 'Ndrangheta, and the Camorra---met in 2009, and agreed on a list of prosecutors and one journalist to be murdered (Faris, 2010). If this allegation is correct, it would suggest that conditions still exist in Italy that would prompt organized crime to plan the murder of honest public officials.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> The Italian plot may have been a ruse designed to induce law enforcement to divert resources to protect the targets of the alleged plot. A story circulated in November of 1930 that Al Capone had imported five gunmen from New York to murder George Johnson (federal prosecutor in Chicago), Pat Roche (state's attorney investigator), and Art Madden and Frank Wilson (members of the U.S. Treasury Department Intelligence Unit). The authors of two books, one on Capone (Schoenberg, 1992, pp.296-297), and the other on Capone and Treasury agent Eliot Ness (Collins

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and Schwartz, 2018, pp.308-309 and 620-621) doubt that such a plot existed. Outfit expert John Binder also is dubious of this plot (e-mail to the author, September 19, 2018). Capone may have simply wanted law enforcement to focus on the protection of the individuals said to have been threatened, and on the search for the hired guns.

**Table 1. Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century Membership in Italian Organized Crime Groups and The Five Costra Nostra families in New York City (m = million).**

<u>Group(s)</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u># of members</u>	<u>Members per 100,000 population</u>
5 Cosa Nostra families (ACN)	NYC (USA)	8m	765	10
Sacra Corona Unita	Apulia (Italy)	4m	2,000	50
Camorra	Campania (Italy)	5.8m	6,700	116
Cosa Nostra (SCN)	Sicily (Italy)	5m	6,000-7000	120-140
‘Ndrangheta	Calabria (Italy)	2m	10,000	500

Sources. Membership numbers for the five NYC families are from Lombardi (2005) and Capeci (2005). For the Italian organizations, the numbers are from Santino (2015, pp.109 and 121). Paoli (2003, p.32) claims there were approximately 3,500 to 4,000 full members in the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, and more than 5,000 full members in the ‘Ndrangheta (circa 2000). Since Santino does not use the word “full,” it is possible his figures include associates. Even the lower figures for the SCN and ‘Ndrangheta suggested by Paoli reveal a much larger presence of those groups in their areas than is the case for the ACN in NYC, with the latter the largest concentration of Cosa Nostra members in the U.S.

## Appendix A

### *Murders of Public Officials in Chicago, 1919-1933.*

As discussed in Section 3, I count eighteen gangland murders of honest public officials in Chicago in the period 1919-1933. Note: CPO denotes Chicago Police Officer, and CPD denotes Chicago Police Department. This list is derived from Johnson (2014), Binder (2017), a list provided to me by John Binder, and an e-mail to the author from John Binder (October 13, 2018).

### *Eight murders by members of Italian-American organizations.*

In 1923, CPO Lawrence Hartnett Jr. was murdered conducting a bootlegging raid of associates of the Genna gang (Johnson, 2014, p.57).

In 1924, CPO David L. Boitano was murdered. He had spent over a decade investigating Sicilian gangsters, and a member of the Aiello gang was a suspect (Johnson, 2014, p.63).

In 1925, CPOs Charles Walsh and Harold Olson were killed in a high speed chase with Albert Anselmi and John Scalise who belonged to the Genna gang (Johnson, 2014, p.71).

In 1927, CPO Herman Carcelli was killed by men presumed to be gangsters who fired from a speeding car (Johnson, 2014, p.82). This murder was likely the work of Chicago Heights gangsters Jimmy Emery and Dominic Roberto (e-mail to the author from John Binder, October 13, 2018).

In 1928, ward committeeman candidate Octavius Granady was murdered. Suspects belonged to the Chicago Outfit (Johnson, 2014, p.106, and Binder 2017, p.212).

In 1928, Chicago Heights police chief Leroy Gilbert was murdered. He had taken action against local mobsters Jimmy Emery and Dominic Roberto (Johnson, 2014, p.115).

In 1931, Melrose Park police chief Rocco Passarello was murdered. He had vigorously pursued bootleggers. Melrose Park was controlled by Joe Montana and Capone ally Rocco DeGrazia (Binder, 2017, p.209).

### *Six murders by members of other organizations or no organization.*

In 1920, CPOs William E. Hennessy and James A. Mulcahy were murdered by Hirche Miller, a whiskey runner (Johnson, 2014, p.43).

In 1926, CPO Michael Madigan was murdered by bootlegger James Beninato (Johnson, 2014, p.84).

In 1929, CPO Joseph J. Sullivan was murdered. The likely suspects were associates of speakeasy owner Joseph Bolton (Johnson, 2014, pp.123-124).

In 1929, Berwyn police chief Charles Levy was murdered. The suspects were Eddie Maciejewski and Willie Doody (Johnson, 2014, p.124).



In 1930, CPO William Rumbler was murdered in an armed robbery. The suspects were Walter Evenow, John Senow, and Frank Mallen. (Johnson, 2014, p.140).

*Two murders by unknown individuals.*

In 1925, CPO Frederick M. Schmitz was killed by a bomb apparently intended for his neighbor, Captain Ira McDowell of the CPD. The assailants were presumed to be gamblers or bootleggers, and were unknown (Johnson, 2014, p.76).

In 1925, Mariano Muscarello was murdered (Johnson, 2014, p.77). He was a deputy sheriff who operated a pool hall, and may have been the victim of a bootlegging gang (e-mail to the author from John Binder, October 13, 2018).

*One spur of the moment murder by members of an Italian-American organization.*

In 1919, an unnamed security guard was killed in a payroll heist by members of the Gloriana gang (Johnson, 2014, p.33).

*One inadvertent murder of someone by members of an Italian-American organization.*

In 1926, Assistant Cook County State's Attorney was murdered in an attack by Capone gunmen on the West Side gang. McSwiggen was out with friends, and it is highly unlikely the Capone men knew he was one of the victims (Johnson, 2014, p.82, and Binder, 2017, pp.163-164).

## Appendix B

### *Murders of Public Officials in Sicily, 1979-1993*

The names of all but one of the fifty-five murder victims come from the excellent book by Santino (2015). Most of the suspected victims of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (SCN) were killed in Sicily. These individuals were presumed murdered because they opposed the SCN. I found one other murder in Wikipedia. Antonio Scopelliti, a Supreme Court prosecutor, was apparently killed by the 'Ndrangheta on behalf of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. An asterisk will indicate if the victim was killed outside of Sicily. All but two of the victims were killed in Sicily, with most of them killed in or near Palermo.

*1979 (6 murders)*. Mario Francese, a journalist, was murdered in Palermo. Michele Reina, provincial secretary of the Christian Democrats, was murdered in Palermo. Lawyer Giorgio Ambrosoli,\* who was liquidating the banks of SCN financier Michele Sindona, was murdered in Milan. Deputy chief of police Boris Giuliano was murdered in Palermo. Magistrate Cesare Terranova and Lenin Mancuso, who worked with Terranova, were murdered in Palermo.

*1980 (3 murders)*. Regional President Piersanti Mattarella was murdered. Carabinieri<sup>24</sup> captain Emmanuele Basile was murdered. Chief Prosecutor Gaetano Costa was murdered. All were murdered in Palermo.

*1981 (1 murder)*. Marshal Vito Ievolella was murdered in Palermo.

*1982 (7 murders)*. The regional secretary of the Communist Party, Pio La Torre, and his associate, Rosario DeSalvo, were murdered. Police doctor Paolo Giaccone was murdered. The prefect and former carabinieri General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, his wife Emanuela, and his body guard, Domenico Russo, were murdered. Police officer Calogero Zucchetto was murdered. All were murdered in Palermo.

*1983 (7 murders)*. The magistrate Giangiacomo Ciaccio Montalto was murdered in Trapani. Carabinieri officers Mario D'Aleo, Giuseppe Bommarito, and Pietro Morici were murdered in Palermo. Chief investigating magistrate Rocco Chinici and his bodyguards, Salvatore Bartolotta and Mario Trapassi, were murdered in Palermo.

*1984 (1 murder)*. Writer Giuseppe Fava was murdered in Catania.

*1985 (3 murders)*. Police inspector Beppe Montana was murdered near Palermo. Police officers Nino Cassarà and Roberto Antiochia were murdered in Palermo.

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<sup>24</sup> The Italian carabinieri is a military force charged with police duties.

*1988 (5 murders).* Former mayor Giuseppe Insalco was murdered in Palermo. Police officer Natale Mondo was murdered in Palermo. Judge Antonio Saetta and his son Sefano were murdered near Canicattì. Mario Rostagno, former leader of the left-wing group Lotta continua, was murdered near Trapani.

*1989 (2 murders).* Police officer Antonio Agostino and his wife, Francessa Citarda, were murdered in Palermo.

*1990 (2 murders).* Regional civil servant Giovanni Bonsignore was murdered in Palermo. Magistrate Rosario Livatino was murdered by the Stidda near Agrigento. The Stidda were a separate organized crime group in Sicily. It is possible this murder was unrelated to the state's attack on the SCN.

*1991 (2 murders).* The businessman Liberio Grassi, who had publicized his refusal to comply with SCN extortion, was murdered in Palermo. Antonio Scopelliti\* (see above) was murdered in Calabria.

*1992 (14 murders).* Businessman Paolo Borsellino was murdered in Agrigento. Judge Giovanni Falcone, his wife, Francesca Morvillo, and their bodyguards Rocco Diccillo, Antonio Montinaro, and Vito Schifani were murdered near Palermo. Judge Paolo Borsellino (not to be confused with the businessman with the same name) and police officers Agostino Catalano, Walter Cosina, Emanuela Loi, Vincenzo Li Muli, and Claudio Traina were murdered in Palermo. Former naval captain Paolo Ficalora was murdered in Trapani. Giuseppe Borsellino, father of businessman Paolo Borsellino, who helped authorities investigate his son's murder, was murdered. I am not certain where he was murdered, but it appears to have been in Sicily.

*1993 (2 murders).* Journalist Beppe Alfano was murdered in Messina. Pino Puglisi, a priest who worked to improve conditions in an area where the SCN was strong, was murdered in Palermo.

## Appendix C

*The effect of increased law enforcement effort on the likelihood an organized crime group attacks the state*

In Section 7, I showed that an increase in the scale of law enforcement activity against an organized crime group (OCG) has an ambiguous effect on  $p^*$ , where a smaller  $p^*$  means less likelihood the OCG will attack the state. Again  $\theta$  measures the scale of law enforcement, with  $d\theta > 0$  implying greater effort by law enforcement. In Section 7, I conjectured it might be the case that  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta}$  is positive for low values of  $\theta$ , and negative for larger values of  $\theta$ . This would offer another reason why the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (SCN) first attacked the state when the state began to go after the SCN, and later the SCN ceased its war on the state when the law enforcement effort against the SCN was even larger.

Using eq.(10) in the text, let  $\psi \equiv \left[ (z - x) \frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} + (x - y) \frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} \right]$ . Then  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} \leq 0$  as  $\psi \leq 0$ .<sup>25</sup>

Recall  $x$  is the OCG's profit when it attacks the state and the state is weak,  $z$  is the OCG's profit when it attacks the state and the state is strong,  $y$  is the OCG's profit when it does not attack the state, and  $x > y > z$ .

In the text it was argued that  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} < 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} < 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial x}{\partial \theta} = 0$ . Suppose  $x = k$ ,  $y = k - \theta$ , and  $z = k - 1 - \theta^2$ , with  $k > 0$ .

Clearly  $x$  exceeds both  $y$  and  $z$  as long as there is any law enforcement effort ( $\theta > 0$ ). Now it must be shown that  $y > z$ . This is true if  $1 + \theta^2 > \theta$ , or if  $\frac{1}{\theta} + \theta > 1$ . Now  $\frac{\partial(\frac{1}{\theta} + \theta)}{\partial \theta} = 1 - \frac{1}{\theta^2}$ , and  $\frac{\partial^2(\frac{1}{\theta} + \theta)}{\partial \theta^2} = \frac{2}{\theta^3} > 0$ . Thus, solving  $1 - \frac{1}{\theta^2} = 0$  yields the value of  $\theta$  that minimizes  $\frac{1}{\theta} + \theta$ , and that value is  $\theta = 1$ , which means that  $\frac{1}{\theta} + \theta = 2$ . Therefore  $y > z$ .

Now  $z - x = -(1 + \theta^2)$ ,  $\frac{\partial y}{\partial \theta} = -1$ ,  $x - y = \theta$ , and  $\frac{\partial z}{\partial \theta} = -2\theta$ . Thus,  $\psi = (1 + \theta^2) - 2\theta^2 = 1 - \theta^2$ . For  $\theta < 1$ ,  $\psi > 0$  so  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} > 0$ , and, for  $\theta > 1$ ,  $\psi < 0$  so  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta} < 0$ .

This example, with simple explicit functions for  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$ , illustrates the possibility that, with a low level of law enforcement effort, an increase in such effort increases the likelihood of an attack on the state by the OCG, whereas, at a larger law enforcement effort level, increased law enforcement effort decreases the likelihood of such an attack.

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<sup>25</sup> In the text I converted  $\psi$  to elasticities (ineq.(12)), but it is easier to prove using  $\psi$  that  $\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \theta}$  is first positive, and then later is negative as  $\theta$  increases.

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